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DO FOREIGN NATIONS HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS?
Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.*
Ingrid Wuerth challenges the conventional wisdom that the Constitution
does not grant any procedural rights, such as notice and personal jurisdiction,
to foreign countries.1 This issue became salient in 1976, when the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) authorized suits against a “Foreign State”
in American courts in a few situations (e.g., where that nation had engaged
in commercial activity or expropriated property).2 Congress has recently
added exceptions related to government-assisted terrorism,3 which has
further increased litigation involving “Foreign States” and state-owned
enterprises (SOEs).4
As Professor Wuerth demonstrates, federal courts have responded by
recognizing constitutional procedural rights for foreign individuals and
corporations, but not the countries themselves (on the theory that they are
protected exclusively by international law).5 This distinction routinely
requires judges to ascertain whether a nominally private foreign enterprise
should be treated as independent or instead as a “Foreign State,” which
depends on the degree of government control.6 This difficult judgment
determines whether constitutional procedural protections will attach.7
Professor Wuerth persuasively attacks this precedent.8 How, she asks, can
the Constitution bestow procedural rights on foreign terrorists and their
private sponsors, but not on the nations they target?9 There is no logical
answer, which suggests a fundamental flaw in this jurisprudence.
Wuerth addresses this problem by examining Article III and the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause in historical context, which yields two
conclusions. First, Article III’s extension of “judicial Power” to “Cases”
* James Wilson Endowed Professor, Pepperdine University School of Law. J.D. Yale, 1988.
1. Ingrid Wuerth, The Due Process and Other Constitutional Rights of Foreign Nations,
88 FORDHAM L. REV. 633, 635–36, 640–53 (2019) (summarizing and criticizing this
consensus).
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1391, 1441, 1602–11.
3. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 640 n.30 (citing amendments in 2012 and 2016).
4. Id. at 636, 640–44, 646–53.
5. Id. at 635–36, 640–53.
6. Id. at 636, 640, 642–53.
7. Id. at 636, 640, 642–44, 647–51.
8. Id. at 635–39, 642–44, 647–53.
9. Id. at 635–36.

142

2019]

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS?

143

involving “foreign States” shielded such sovereigns from suit unless they
could be reached by a federal court’s “process”—a summons to appear after
notice and service of pleadings in a case within the court’s personal
jurisdiction.10 Such procedures would protect foreign countries against
unfair proceedings and prevent international conflict.11 Second, under the
Due Process Clause, foreign governments were “persons” entitled to similar
“process.”12 In short, Article III and the Due Process Clause overlapped in
ensuring litigation-related rights for all parties, including foreign nations.13
Wuerth proposes that courts revive this original meaning.14
Her foundational premise is that the Constitution’s Framers, Ratifiers, and
early interpreters did not precisely use terminology such as “judicial power,”
“cases,” “controversies,” “due process,” “subject matter jurisdiction,” and
“personal jurisdiction.” Professor Wuerth follows suit by collapsing these
terms into a general analytical framework, which is then applied specifically
to litigation involving foreign sovereigns.
I submit, however, that these words (and the concepts they convey) were—
and still are—distinct, albeit related. In particular, clarity would be promoted
by treating Article III—which primarily concerns subject matter jurisdiction
over three categories of “Cases” and six types of “Controversies”—
separately from Due Process issues such as personal jurisdiction. Moreover,
Article III’s text and history indicate that its drafters included
“Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects” to ensure that such disputes would be resolved
impartially by federal judges who, unlike their state counterparts, enjoyed
tenure and salary guarantees that insulated them from political pressure.15
By contrast, Professor Wuerth presents no direct evidence that the Framers
or Ratifiers understood this Alienage Clause as guaranteeing procedural
rights to foreign nations. Therefore, although I agree with her thesis that
foreign governments should receive the same constitutional procedural
protections as their citizens and enterprises, the main font of those rights
should be the Due Process Clause rather than Article III.
I will develop the foregoing ideas primarily by critiquing Professor
Wuerth’s historical analysis of those two constitutional provisions. I will
then consider some modern implications of her proposal.

10. Id. at 636–37, 639, 653–73, 690.
11. Id. at 637, 639, 653–55, 659–61, 670–73, 687, 690.
12. Id. at 637–39, 673–80, 690.
13. Id. at 636–39, 653–90.
14. Id. at 638–39, 653, 680–90.
15. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III’s Case/Controversy Distinction and the Dual
Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 449–50, 459, 469–72, 482–86,
492–96, 504–11, 519, 523–31 (1994) [hereinafter Pushaw, Case/Controversy]. I have
published several lengthy articles exploring the Constitution’s original meaning concerning
the federal judiciary. This essay will usually summarize these works without reproducing
their supporting sources.
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I. ARTICLE III AND PROCEDURAL RIGHTS
A. Professor Wuerth’s Interpretation
After examining the drafting, ratification, and early implementation of
Article III, Wuerth concludes that its grant of “judicial Power” over “Cases”
extended only as far as a federal court’s “process” could reach parties (or
their property) located within its territorial jurisdiction.16 She asserts that
“the word ‘case’ does not appear to have had a precise, technical meaning,”17
but then finds that it actually had very specific procedural connotations. For
example, “a ‘case’ required that a dispute be submitted in proper form”18—
namely, by parties who were subject to the court’s “process” (i.e., amenable
to its personal jurisdiction and summons).19 Similarly, “case” overlapped
with “cause” and “suit,” which in the eighteenth century featured strict
procedural rules.20 Separation-of-powers principles reinforced that Article
III conferred subject matter jurisdiction over nine “Cases” and
“Controversies” only if basic procedural requirements like personal
jurisdiction had been satisfied.21
Professor Wuerth further claims that these two words were synonymous,
with one trivial exception—a “Case” encompassed criminal and civil
proceedings, whereas a “Controversy” included only the latter.22
Accordingly, she applies her general vision of Article III “judicial Power”
over “Cases” to those involving foreign nations,23 even though Article III
itself refers to “Controversies” between foreign states and American states
(or their citizens).24 In any event, such jurisdiction generated little opposition
during the Convention and Ratification debates, as Wuerth shows.25 Indeed,
the only serious objection to it—that judgments against foreign countries
could not be enforced—prompted the logical response that such recalcitrance
would be unlikely, as the sovereign would already have consented to suit and
hence would presumably comply with the judgment.26
In sum, Professor Wuerth maintains that the Framers and Ratifiers thought
that the valid exercise of “judicial Power” over “Cases” involving “foreign

16. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 637–39, 653–73, 690.
17. Id. at 663.
18. Id. at 664. Wuerth repeatedly assumes that all “cases” involve “disputes” between
adverse parties, but that is not necessarily true. See infra notes 42–43 and accompanying text.
19. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 661–65.
20. See id. at 662–64; see also id. at 663–64 (observing that a “suit” or “cause” typically
denoted the institution of an action, whereas “case” signified an action that had already
commenced or had been decided).
21. Id. at 636–39, 651–69, 679–80, 690.
22. Id. at 653 n.120, 661.
23. Id. at 637 (“Article III extends federal judicial power to cases involving foreign
states.”); id. at 653, 657–60, 673–74, 681, 683, 685, 690 (same).
24. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
25. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 637, 655–56.
26. Id. at 656.
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States” mandated adherence to procedural formalities.27 She reinforces this
point by citing The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,28 which she
characterizes as holding that, even though the Supreme Court had subject
matter jurisdiction over a property claim brought by private parties against a
foreign nation (France), it lacked personal jurisdiction to reach French
warships in United States waters because sovereigns were immune from
process under international law.29
B. A Different View of Article III
My research on Article III’s original meaning suggests that Professor
Wuerth uses several terms interchangeably that would be better kept
separate.30 Section 1 of Article III vests “judicial Power,” which by 1787
had an established definition: rendering a final judgment after interpreting
the governing law and applying it to the facts.31 Therefore, “judicial Power”
primarily concerned adjudication—not jurisdiction, as Wuerth believes.32
27. Id. at 653–69. A judgment entered where a court lacked jurisdiction would be void—
coram non judice. Id. at 667–69.
28. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
29. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 671–72; see also id. at 671–73 (citing other decisions from
1795, 1822, and 1823). In Schooner Exchange, the Court did not actually use terms like
“subject matter jurisdiction,” “personal jurisdiction,” and “process.” Initially, Chief Justice
Marshall admitted he was “exploring an unbeaten path” and thus had to resort to “general
principles” of the law of nations. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136. The basic principle was that the
United States, like any sovereign, had exclusive jurisdiction to control anything within its
territorial jurisdiction unless it voluntarily consented to an exception. Id. The Court
determined that America had implicitly made an exception by adopting the practice of
civilized nations to immunize from suit a friendly foreign government (and its ships, including
armed vessels) that came into its ports. Id. at 137–46. Although the United States retained
sovereign power to withdraw this consent, such a change had to be unambiguous (to give other
countries notice) and would never be inferred from a general grant of jurisdiction. Id. at 146.
The Court recognized that any such repudiation of sovereign immunity which led to an adverse
judgment against a foreign government could not be enforced judicially, but only by either
military force or diplomatic negotiation. Id.
The Schooner Exchange is typical of most early litigation, which did not concern an
American court’s assertion of jurisdiction against the foreign state as a party, but rather
admiralty jurisdiction over a foreign government’s property (usually a ship or its cargo)
located within its territory. That distinction, however, did not affect the political repercussions
that would result from an American court’s attempt to seize jurisdiction.
30. See Pushaw, Case/Controversy, supra note 15, at 447–50, 457, 465–532.
31. For a detailed history of the Anglo-American idea of “judicial power,” see id. at 471–
74, 484–92, 512–17, 523–24; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts
and the Structural Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 741–42, 746, 789, 799, 805–06, 809,
827–28, 844–48, 850, 853, 860 (2001) [hereinafter Pushaw, Inherent]; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr.,
Justiciability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV.
393, 398, 402–07, 417–27, 431–34, 436–44 (1996) [hereinafter Pushaw, Justiciability].
32. Valid adjudication requires applying preexisting law, both substantive and procedural.
See Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 31, at 397–98, 402, 406, 417–18, 426–27. The First
Congress confirmed the shared understanding that state law would supply the baseline rules
in federal courts. Initially, the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92, provided that
the substantive rules of decision would be “the laws of the several states, except where the
constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide.” A
few days later, the Process Act, ch. 21, § 2, 1 Stat. 93, 93–94, mandated application of the
procedural rules of the state in which the federal court sat, subject to the courts’ formal
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Admittedly, the proper exercise of “judicial Power” ordinarily
presupposes that a court has jurisdiction. But that is not always true. For
instance, a court may legitimately assert “judicial Power” to issue a judgment
that it does not have jurisdiction.33 Similarly, a court can exercise “judicial
Power” absent personal jurisdiction if a defendant waives this objection, even
inadvertently.34
Returning to my key point, “judicial Power” in Section 1 focused on
adjudication, whereas the topic of subject matter jurisdiction was addressed
in a separate paragraph of Article III: Section 2, which lists various “Cases”
and “Controversies.”35 Professor Wuerth’s conflation of these words, except
for the minor “criminal vs. civil” distinction, is inadequate.36 A far more
important difference concerns the main role courts would be expected to play
in “Cases,” as opposed to “Controversies.”37
Section 2 begins by repeating the phrase “all Cases” three times to
introduce jurisdictional grants defined by legal subject matter—federal law,
admiralty and maritime, and the international law governing foreign
ministers. Section 2 then shifts to the word “Controversies” to denote six
jurisdictional categories based on party configurations—including
“Controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
States, Citizens or Subjects.” This structural division between “Cases” and
“Controversies” reinforced the distinct primary function judges were
expected to discharge in each category.38
“Case” derives from the Latin casus, or “chance.”39 In eighteenth-century
legal parlance, a “case” was a happenstance occurrence that allegedly
violated someone’s legal rights in a way that gave rise to a recognized cause

amendment when necessary. Congress retained ultimate power to fix procedural rules. See
Pushaw, Inherent, supra note 31, at 747–51.
33. The earliest example is Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). There all of the
Justices rendered opinions concluding that Congress had improperly granted them jurisdiction
to determine disabled veterans’ pension eligibility, subject to revision by the federal executive
and legislative branches, in violation of the principle that court judgments had to be final. See
Pushaw, Justiciabiliy, supra note 31, at 438–41 (analyzing Hayburn’s Case).
34. This longstanding principle has been encapsulated in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(2).
35. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Congressional Power
Over Federal Court Jurisdiction: A Defense of the Neo-Federalist Interpretation of Article
III, 1997 BYU L. REV. 847, 860–63 [hereinafter Pushaw, Congressional Power] (evaluating
possible differences between “judicial power” and the specific grants of “jurisdiction” in
Section 2).
36. Wuerth does not mention that the “civil vs. criminal” distinction had not appeared as
of 1787, but rather was developed in the 1790s. See Pushaw, Congressional Power, supra
note 35, at 864–73. Consequently, no historical evidence supports the notion that the Framers
incorporated this distinction.
37. See Pushaw, Case/Controversy, supra note 15, at 449–50, 465–511, 518–19.
38. Id. at 449–50, 471–72, 499–511.
39. See id. at 472 n.133; Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Limiting Article III Standing to
“Accidental” Plaintiffs: Lessons from Environmental and Animal Law Cases, 45 GEORGIA L.
REV. 1, 11, 67 (2010) [hereinafter Pushaw, Limiting].
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of action in a trial court or to an appeal.40 A court’s principal task in a “case”
was to interpret and apply the law, guided by precedent.41 Although many
Article III “Cases” involved disputes between adverse parties, others did
not—for example, naturalization proceedings and writs challenging
government action.42 And even when a dispute had arisen, a federal court’s
central job was not merely arbitrating it but rather expounding laws in areas
of national importance.43
As Professor Wuerth acknowledges, I noted long ago that an Article
III “Case,” historically understood, had a procedural component.44 At the
trial level a “Case” would be presented only if a plaintiff complied with
demanding procedural rules in setting forth a cause of action that fell within
a form recognized in law or equity.45 “Cases” thus focused primarily on the
plaintiff’s claims, not on the defendant’s objections (such as lack of personal
jurisdiction).
Turning to “controversy,” this word had the same meaning in 1787 as it
does today:
a dispute.46
That explains why the Framers chose
“Controversies” to introduce the six jurisdictional categories defined by
adverse parties, in which a federal court’s main function would be to resolve
the dispute impartially.47 Legal exposition would be secondary—indeed, the
applicable law was often prescribed by a state.48
40. See Pushaw, Limiting, supra note 39, at 11, 66–68, 73, 76–82, 95, 101, 105; see also
Pushaw, Case/Controversy, supra note 15, at 449–50, 472–82, 490–91, 496.
41. See Pushaw, Limiting, supra note 39, at 11–15, 66, 73–74, 76–77; Pushaw,
Case/Controversy, supra note 15, at 449, 459, 470, 472–82, 489–92, 494–504, 519, 523–31;
Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 31, at 398, 402, 406, 417–18, 423, 426, 436, 447.
42. See Pushaw, Case/Controversy, supra note 15, at 480–82, 498, 500–01, 516, 526–27,
530. My insight that “Cases” did not necessarily require adversarial disputes has been
developed in an article that demonstrates the wide range of non-contentious “cases” that
federal courts have always decided. See James E. Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III
Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious Jurisdiction, 124 YALE
L.J. 1346 (2015).
43. See Pushaw, Case/Controversy, supra note 15, at 472–82, 489–504.
44. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 661 n.174, 662 n.181 (citing Pushaw, Case/Controversy,
supra note 15, at 450, 473, 483).
45. See Pushaw, Case/Controversy, supra note 15, at 449, 472-74, 480 n.171, 496, 527;
Pushaw, Justiciability, supra note 31, at 406, 426, 437–38; Pushaw, Limiting, supra note 39,
at 11, 68–69, 76–79.
46. See Pushaw, Case/Controversy, supra note 15, at 450, 482–83, 493–94, 519.
47. Id. at 450, 459, 472, 482–84, 493–96, 504–11, 519, 523–31.
48. Id. at 450, 483, 504–05, 511. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92,
made state law the default rule of decision in federal courts, with no exception for
controversies involving foreign nations. Nonetheless, such disputes would typically implicate
the international law of sovereign immunity. See infra notes 51–57, 60–66 and accompanying
text. If the foreign country consented to jurisdiction, state substantive law would
presumptively apply. However, if treaties were at issue, it would be an Article III “Case[] . . .
arising under . . . [federal] Treaties” and hence fall within the first tier of jurisdiction, where
the federal courts’ chief role was expounding the law. The same analysis applies to “Cases of
admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction,” which often involved foreign sovereigns.
Hamilton acknowledged that in theory a state court could handle the state law issues
in controversies involving foreign nations and their citizens, but concluded that (1) federal or
international law questions would usually arise, and (2) the “safe and most expedient” course
was to entrust all litigation involving foreign parties to impartial “national tribunals” to avoid
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Article III includes only those “Controversies” litigated to vindicate
recognized legal rights according to established procedural rules.49 In this
regard, I agree with Professor Wuerth that “Cases” and “Controversies”
featured similar procedures.50 But that does not mean these two words were
otherwise identical.
Furthermore, Wuerth does not cite any Framer or Ratifier who said that
the purpose of conferring subject matter jurisdiction over “Controversies”
involving “foreign States” was to secure procedural rights such as notice,
service, and personal jurisdiction. By contrast, leading Federalists such as
James Wilson, Alexander Hamilton, and John Marshall emphasized that this
head of jurisdiction would ensure that such disputes would be umpired by an
impartial federal court (usually the Supreme Court),51 not politically
dependent state judges whose decisions against a foreign country would often
be viewed as biased and thereby cause conflict.52 As Madison declared:
I do not conceive that any controversy can ever be decided . . . between an
American State and a foreign State, without the consent of the parties. If
they consent, provision is here made. The disputes ought to be tried by the
national tribunal. This is consonant with the law of nations. Could there
be a more favorable or eligible provision to avoid controversies with
foreign powers? Ought it to be put in the power of a member of the Union
to drag the whole community into war? As the national tribunal is to
decide, justice will be done . . . . [T]hough . . . this jurisdiction . . . may
the possibility of a single state disrupting America’s peace. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 536
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
49. See Pushaw, Case/Controversy, supra note 15, at 483 n.183.
50. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 661 n.174, 662 n.181 (citing Pushaw, Case/Controversy,
supra note 15, at 450, 473, 483).
51. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction whenever a state is a party, thereby
assuring the most trustworthy forum when a foreign nation sued a state itself (or vice versa, if
the sovereign consented). See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2; Wuerth, supra note 1, at 637,
657–61 (arguing that this self-executing grant of original jurisdiction proves that foreign states
cannot be completely outside the American constitutional system).
52. See 3 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE CONSTITUTION 557 (1901) (Marshall) (“[I]n controversies between a state
and a foreign state, . . . [t]he previous consent of the parties is necessary” and therefore they
would likely “acquiesce” to the court’s judgment, so this jurisdictional grant would “be the
means of preventing disputes with foreign nations.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 535–36, 541
(Hamilton) (to similar effect).
Wilson praised the Constitution as history’s first attempt to settle controversies
involving foreign governments through independent courts applying the law of nations, rather
than through mediation, arbitration, or war. COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 685–87
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007). The critical purpose of the Article III
provisions respecting foreign countries and individuals was to provide them with a “just and
impartial [federal] tribunal”—not a state court—to resolve controversies (especially suits to
recover debts owed by American states or citizens) “in order to preserve peace with foreign
nations.” Id. at 246–49. Because Wilson knew that sovereign immunity was a basic principle
of the law of nations, he likely expected federal courts to apply that rule.
In passing, Professor Wuerth notes that one purpose of the Alienage Clause was “to
provide a fair forum to resolve disputes involving foreign nations.” Wuerth, supra note 1, at
637. However, she contends that the Framers’ central goal was to provide the same baseline
procedural rights for foreign states that would be given to other litigants. Id. at 636–39, 653–
69.
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seldom or never operate, . . . [when it does it will be] of great importance,
and indispensably necessary.53

Professor Wuerth quotes portions of the statements of Madison, Hamilton,
and Marshall.54 Yet they do not support her theory, as they say nothing about
procedural protections. Conversely, these statements reinforce my thesis that
a federal court’s major role would be to neutrally resolve such disputes. For
example, Madison refers to a “controversy” involving a foreign sovereign,
equates that word with “dispute,” and contends that such “controversies”
should be decided by a “national” (as opposed to a state) tribunal that will
render impartial “justice.” Similarly, Joseph Story remarked:
In regard to controversies between an American and foreign state, it is
obvious that the suit must, on one side at least, be wholly voluntary. No
foreign state can be compelled to become a party, plaintiff or defendant, in
any of our tribunals. If, therefore, it chooses to consent to the institution of
any suit, it is consent alone, which can give effect to the jurisdiction of the
court.55

These contemporaneous comments reflected a bedrock law-of-nations
principle: Sovereigns enjoyed immunity from suits in other nations’ courts.56
It is possible that the Framers and Ratifiers thought the Constitution
implicitly incorporated this immunity rule, so that the federal government
could not abrogate it.57 Cutting against this conclusion is Article III’s text,
which sets forth the maximum extent of the judiciary’s subject matter
jurisdiction and gives Congress broad discretion to assign and limit it.58
Wuerth argues that the Constitution, as originally understood, permitted
Congress to grant federal courts jurisdiction over controversies between
states (or their citizens) and foreign nations without the latter’s consent—and
thereby to override the general principle of sovereign immunity that courts
would otherwise apply—even though such a statute would be “extremely
unlikely.”59 Nonetheless, even if Congress unexpectedly abrogated such
53. 3 ELLIOT, supra note 52, at 533–34.
54. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 655 n.134 (Hamilton); 656 n.139 (Madison); 656 n.140
(Marshall) (citations omitted).
55. 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 570
(1833).
56. See supra notes 50–55 and accompanying text.
57. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 684 (acknowledging, but rejecting, this possibility).
58. Because Article III judicial power “shall” [i.e., must] extend to “all” Cases involving
federal law, admiralty, and foreign ministers, Congress’s discretion in this category is limited
to deciding whether to assign such cases to federal trial courts, appellate courts, or the Supreme
Court. By contrast, since federal judicial power need not extend to “all” Controversies,
Congress may—but need not—give any federal court jurisdiction and can restrict any
jurisdiction granted. See Pushaw, Congressional Power, supra note 35, at 849–50, 856–64,
873–97.
59. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 683–84; see also id. at 639–40, 644–47, 649–51, 656,
671–73, 676–78 (describing foreign sovereign immunity). For this proposition, she relies on
The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). As discussed in note
29, the Court did not rely on the Constitution but rather the law of nations, which presumed
foreign sovereign immunity. Id. at 137–46. Chief Justice Marshall declared that he would
never infer that the United States intended to repudiate this principle—and cause international
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immunity, under the law of nations a foreign country could refuse to submit
to an American court’s jurisdiction, and any resulting default judgment could
not be enforced by the United States unless it was willing to risk war.60
The foregoing analysis reveals that, although federal judicial independence
would be beneficial regardless of whether the foreign nation was a plaintiff
or defendant, the former situation would be far more common because an
American court could not successfully assert jurisdiction over a foreign
sovereign defendant involuntarily.61 Consequently, this invocation of
immunity would terminate such jurisdiction—it would “seldom or never
operate,” in Madison’s words—and leave the issue to diplomatic or military
resolution.62 Therefore, procedural protections like notice, service, and
personal jurisdiction—which aim to spare defendants not located within a
court’s territorial jurisdiction the inconvenience, cost, and potential bias of
being dragged into a distant forum63—would not be needed by a foreign
government.
conflict—unless the federal government did so unambiguously. Id. at 146. Marshall’s
Schooner Exchange opinion, which concedes the novelty of the issue, id. at 136, adds a
wrinkle to his Ratification comment that foreign states would always need to consent to
jurisdiction. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
More recently, the Court recognized that “[f]or more than a century and a half, the
United States generally granted foreign sovereigns complete immunity from suit,” but
concluded that this practice reflected voluntary comity rather than a constitutional
requirement. Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983). The Court
held that the FSIA exception to a foreign state’s sovereign immunity for its commercial acts
did not violate the Constitution because Congress had clearly exercised its Article III power
to grant federal courts jurisdiction over cases “arising under” federal law—here, a statute
enacted under the Article I power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. Id. at 491–97.
Of special relevance here is the Court’s preliminary ruling that this FSIA exception could not
be based on another Article III power: to confer jurisdiction over controversies between a
state (or its citizens) and a foreign nation. Id. at 491–92.
60. To my knowledge, no Framer or Ratifier publicly discussed the specific issue of
whether the Constitution authorized Congress to abrogate foreign sovereign immunity. The
general question of whether the Founders thought that Congress had constitutional power to
violate the law of nations—and whether courts could remedy alleged violations—has
generated extensive scholarly debate. Compare ANTHONY J. BELLIA JR. & BRADFORD R.
CLARK, THE LAW OF NATIONS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (2017) (arguing that the
Constitution granted Congress and the President exclusive power over foreign affairs, and that
consequently the judiciary had to uphold their political decisions without inquiring into
possible violations of the law of nations) with David M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebach, The
Law of Nations and the Constitution, 106 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1593–98, 1605-58 (2018)
(contending that neither the Founders nor the early Supreme Court believed that Congress
could transgress this international law). Cf. Thomas H. Lee, The Law of Nations and the
Judicial Branch, 106 GEO. L.J. 1707, 1709, 1726–36, 1745 (2018) (maintaining that Article
III and the Judiciary Act of 1789 envisioned an affirmative, albeit restrained, role for federal
courts: ascertaining and applying the multi-dimensional law of nations as federal common
law, absent a contrary rule in the United States Constitution, laws, or treaties).
61. See supra notes 51–60 and accompanying text.
62. See supra note 53 and accompanying text; see also STORY, supra note 55, at 570
(noting that some controversies involving foreign states may “be redressed” judicially rather
than by the usual “instrumentality of negotiations”).
63. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 449 U.S. 286, 291–92 (1980)
(emphasizing this rationale when a state court attempts to assert personal jurisdiction over outof-state citizens); OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1098 (10th
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Obviously, the nations most willing to submit to a federal court as
defendants would be our allies, especially those with commercial interests in
America. In such litigation, judges would presumably take special care to
ensure procedural and substantive fairness, given the sensitive nature of
dealing with a sovereign. Thus, controversies in which a foreign country has
consented to be sued would be the least likely to incite international conflict
(as experience has proved).64
Overall, the Framers included “Controversies” involving “foreign States”
in Article III to achieve the overarching goal of guaranteeing them an
impartial decision-maker when they sued an American state or citizen,
especially to recover debts.65 State courts’ mistreatment of foreign creditors
(including government lenders) had sparked serious international tensions
before 1787, and only disinterested national courts could rectify this
problem.66
II. DUE PROCESS
Professor Wuerth contends that foreign nations are “persons” within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause.67 She demonstrates that “process,” in
the eighteenth century, (1) referred to a court’s writs summoning a defendant
to appear upon receipt of notice and service, and (2) was limited to a court’s
territorial jurisdiction.68 Such “process” extended to all “persons,” including
foreign sovereigns, but could only reach them if they were subject to the
issuing court’s jurisdiction.69 Accordingly, even if a foreign state had
property within an American court’s territorial jurisdiction, the court’s
“process” could not extend to that country absent personal jurisdiction.70
Professor Wuerth convincingly argues that the Due Process Clause, as
originally conceived, gave foreign governments the same “process” rights as
similarly situated defendants. Nonetheless, she does not explain why the Bill
of Rights’ drafters thought that this Clause was necessary if they understood
Article III as already containing the same procedural requirements. The most

Cir. 1998) (applying this rationale in declining “to subject [a Canadian corporation] to the
rigors of litigating in Kansas”).
64. See infra notes 82, 85–88 and accompanying text.
65. Pushaw, Case/Controversy, supra note 15, at 483–84, 506–08. The Judiciary Act of
1789 nowhere expressly granted federal courts jurisdiction over controversies involving
foreign nations as defendants. Indeed, Congress’s only implementation of the Alienage
Clause was to confer jurisdiction on district courts when foreign citizens, as plaintiffs, sued
for torts in violation of a treaty or the law of nations. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1
Stat. 73, 76–77. Similarly, although Article III extends “judicial Power” to “Controversies to
which the United States shall be a Party,” Congress clarified that this provision only applied
where the United States was a plaintiff. See id. §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 77–78.
66. See Pushaw, Case/Controversy, supra note 15, at 507. Professor Wuerth recognizes
this urgent need for a neutral forum for foreign creditors, both private lenders and governments
like England. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 635, 655, 659–60.
67. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 636–39, 673–80, 690.
68. Id. at 673–75, 690.
69. Id. at 676–79.
70. Id. at 676–77.
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logical inference is that this Clause was added to provide new procedural
protections, such as personal jurisdiction.
III. MODERN IMPLICATIONS
A. Article III and Due Process Rights
Professor Wuerth emphasizes that the key purpose of including Article III
jurisdiction over controversies involving “foreign States”—ameliorating
international conflict—has been frustrated by the federal courts’ denying
these nations the same constitutional rights as their citizens or enterprises.71
In her view, the Constitution entrusts Congress—not the judiciary—with
determining the content of “process” rights, as long as Congress (1) respects
the baseline separation-of-powers principles contained in Article III and the
Due Process Clause, and (2) makes those procedural rights available to
foreign countries.72 She concedes that “such protections are minimal” and
that their application would often not have changed results in actual cases,
but notes that these safeguards would prevent federal courts from acting
arbitrarily.73
Wuerth further maintains that the Court has long held that federal statutes
should be interpreted in light of the general law (including principles like
sovereign immunity) but has recognized that Congress could expressly
override that law.74 Consequently, Congress has always had power to subject
foreign governments to federal court jurisdiction without their consent (as in
FSIA), although the Framers and Ratifiers did not expect Congress to do so.75
Finally, Professor Wuerth argues that the Due Process Clause is “flexible,”
so that courts have some discretion to determine what specific procedural
rights foreign nations should receive.76 For instance, some Due Process
rights do not extend beyond United States territory, while others might apply
only to human (not legal) “persons.”77

71. Id. at 634–55, 659–61, 670–73, 687, 690.
72. Id. at 637, 683–86.
73. Id. at 683–85. Most notably, Wuerth assails federal courts for holding that foreign
states should not receive Due Process protections because they are not Fifth Amendment
“persons.” Her approach would lead to the same outcome, but through different reasoning:
The Due Process Clause does protect foreign nations, but Congress can determine the scope
of those procedural rights and has curtailed them in the FSIA. Id. at 685. Wuerth rejects both
the results and reasoning of a different line of lower federal court cases: those that carelessly
import Fourteenth Amendment Due Process “minimum contacts” and “reasonableness”
standards—which determine personal jurisdiction in state courts—to the distinct context of
the Fifth Amendment Due Process rights of foreign nations in federal courts. Id. at 637–38,
679, 681–85.
74. Id. at 683.
75. Id. at 683–84.
76. Id. at 686.
77. Id. If Wuerth is correct that the Constitution grants Congress sole power to identify
“process” rights, it is not clear why she suggests that federal courts also can determine which
such rights foreign nations should receive. It seems that Congress does not really have
exclusive authority, because courts can always review federal statutes to ascertain whether or
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Professor Wuerth’s approach rests on an originalist analysis, yet she
admits that the Framers and Ratifiers did not anticipate that Congress would
ever abrogate the immunity of foreign sovereigns.78 She contends, however,
that the Constitution always included this power, even though it long lay
dormant.79 Concededly, the Constitution often articulates broad principles
that can be adapted to meet new challenges,80 and Congress has expanded
the scope of its power (and that of federal courts) beyond anything the
Founders could have imagined. Nonetheless, Wuerth’s basic theme is that
Article III’s grant to federal courts of “judicial Power” over “Cases”
involving “foreign States” implicitly and permanently baked in procedural
rights like notice and personal jurisdiction.81 If so, however, Article III might
also have inherently locked in a doctrine of sovereign immunity that
Congress cannot eliminate.82
Furthermore, the Court today does not have pressing practical incentives
to reverse course. To her credit, Professor Wuerth acknowledges that her
proposal would afford foreign nations only “minimal” procedural protections
and would change only the rationale, rather than the result, in most cases.83
In such situations, however, stare decisis usually leads courts to adhere to
their precedent, even if it rests on flawed reasoning.84
Similarly, the longstanding judicial practice of giving foreign governments
scant constitutional protections in litigation, even if legally incorrect, has not
led to major strife. For example, since 1917 America has fought many wars,
but none have been precipitated by the failure to accord a foreign country
adequate constitutional procedural rights. The likeliest explanation is that
such rights primarily protect defendants from unfair proceedings in a distant
forum, and a foreign sovereign does not need such protections because it can
refuse to submit to an American court’s jurisdiction or judgment.85 Such
not they comply with Article III or Due Process—constitutional provisions that federal judges
have the final say in interpreting, based on whatever standards they create.
78. Id. at 684.
79. Id.
80. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405–30 (1819).
81. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 636–39, 653–73, 690.
82. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text (citing leading Federalists who
arguably shared this view). This originalist analysis casts doubt upon the FSIA exceptions to
sovereign immunity.
83. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 683–85.
84. To illustrate, Justice Thomas urged adoption of historians’ consensus position that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporated provisions of the Bill of Rights (such as the Second
Amendment) against the states through its Privileges or Immunities Clause—not its Due
Process Clause, as the Court has long held. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,
805–58 (2010) (Thomas, J., concurring). However, his colleagues declined to change
established precedent because the results would be the same, regardless of which clause was
invoked. Id. at 753–87.
85. See supra notes 51–64 and accompanying text. Another reason for the general
absence of international troubles is that the Supreme Court has admonished lower federal and
state courts to carefully “consider the procedural and substantive policies of other nations
whose interests are affected by the assertion of [personal] jurisdiction” against those
sovereigns or their citizens, thereby discouraging the exercise of jurisdiction. Asahi Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1984).
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immunity can be invoked even if Congress purports to abrogate it (as in
FSIA) and a federal court attempts to assert jurisdiction in a controversy that
falls within a statutory exception,86 as a recent dispute with Iran illustrates.87
Conversely, a friendly defendant like England that consents to an American
court’s jurisdiction would almost certainly accept its judgment, whether
adverse or favorable.88
In short, I agree with Professor Wuerth that, if a foreign nation waives
immunity, it should receive the same procedural protections as its citizens or
corporations. But those are precisely the controversies where international
tensions are least likely to surface.
Admittedly, trickier issues arise when an American court takes jurisdiction
over a dispute involving seized assets of a hostile foreign country (or an
enterprise it controls) that are located within the United States’ territorial
jurisdiction.89 In this situation, courts should accord the defendant ordinary
constitutional procedural rights, as Wuerth says.90 Nevertheless, to the
extent that such litigation might (or does) produce international tensions, they
will be resolved through diplomatic channels rather than public federal
judicial proceedings.91 Indeed, such political dispute resolution will occur
whenever a foreign sovereign, friend or foe, perceives mistreatment in an
American court.
86. See supra notes 2–3, 51–64, 75, 78–82 and accompanying text.
87. Recognizing the difficulties of enforcing the FSIA exceptions for terrorism, Congress
amended that law in 2012 to make $1.75 billion in Iranian government assets held in a New
York bank available to partially satisfy federal court default judgments for families of victims
of Iran-sponsored terrorism. Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1316–21 (2016)
(citing statute). Dismissing Iran’s sovereign immunity objection, the Court held that Congress
had not violated separation of powers by directing a federal court to retroactively apply that
amended law in the pending case, which determined the outcome. Id. at 1317, 1322–29.
Iran “rejected” Peterson as “theft” and “incompatible with international law.” Iran
Denounces U.S. Ruling Awarding Iran Money to Bomb Victims, Reuters (Apr. 26, 2016). The
International Court of Justice then assumed jurisdiction in two cases to determine whether the
United States had violated Iran’s rights under a 1955 treaty. See Sabina Veneziano, A Brief
Criticism of the United States’ Strategic Actions in Three Pending ICJ Cases, 51 International
Law & Politics 965, 966–70, 974–77 (2019). Iran might have responded to Peterson through
force rather than litigation except that the year before, the Obama Administration had reached
a nuclear agreement with Iran—and then secretly given it $1.7 billion and access to American
banks to convert another $5.7 billion in Iranian assets. See Marc A. Theissen, Obama Took
Lying to New Heights with the Iran Deal, Washington Post (June 8, 2018).
In short, Congress’s attempts to override a hostile foreign sovereign’s immunity do
not end the matter. See, e.g., Orde Kittrie, Iran Still Owes $53 Billion in Unpaid Court
Judgments to American Victims of Iranian Terrorism, Foundation for Defense of Democracies
(July 31, 2019). Rather, adverse federal judicial decisions result not in compliance but rather
negotiations, international litigation, and military conflict.
88. Attempting to hale a foreign nation involuntarily into an American court presents
entirely different issues than those that arise when such a sovereign sues as plaintiff: “[W]e
are not dealing with an attempt to bring a recognized foreign government into one of our courts
as a defendant and subject it to [our] rule of law . . . . We have a foreign government invoking
our law but resisting a claim against it which fairly would curtail its recovery.” National City
Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361 (1955).
89. See Wuerth, supra note 1, at 635–36, 640–43, 652–53 (citing cases).
90. Id. at 634–53.
91. See supra notes 62, 85–87 and accompanying text.
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B. Other Constitutional Rights
Professor Wuerth suggests that foreign states may have additional
constitutional protections, which should be determined by examining each
individual right.92 For example, those nations should be entitled to Fifth
Amendment protection against double jeopardy and taking of property, as
well as Sixth Amendment rights to a jury trial and assistance of counsel in
criminal proceedings.93 Conversely, foreign governments should not be
granted rights that attach only to human rather than legal “persons,” such as
First and Fourth Amendment rights.94
Wuerth’s granular approach seems far preferable to a categorical rule that
the Constitution as a whole either does or does not apply to foreign
sovereigns. Nonetheless, if she is correct that federal courts have botched
what should have been a simple interpretation of the Due Process Clause as
applicable to foreign nations, it is not apparent why these courts would be
capable of sound analysis of other constitutional rights.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Article III, the Framers vested independent federal courts with “judicial
Power” over party-defined “Controversies”—including those involving
“foreign States”—primarily to ensure an impartial forum to resolve disputes,
not to confer specific procedural rights. The Due Process Clause amended
Article III to clarify that litigants had standard Anglo-American “process”
rights before they could lose their liberty or property.
Whatever the constitutional source and content of such procedural rights,
however, Professor Wuerth persuasively argues that they should apply not
just to foreign individuals and enterprises, but also to foreign nations.
Adoption of this crucial insight would greatly clarify jurisprudence and
scholarship in this area.

92. Wuerth, supra note 1, at 639, 686–90.
93. Id. at 689–90.
94. Id. at 688–89.

